Money creation and control from Islamic perspective by Hasan, Zubair
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Money creation and control from Islamic
perspective
Zubair Hasan
NCEIF The Global University of Islamic Finance
23 January 2011
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/39796/
MPRA Paper No. 39796, posted 1 August 2012 17:11 UTC
 1 
Money creation and control from Islamic perspective 
 
Prof. Dr. Zubair Hasan 
 
Department of Economics & Governance 
INCEIF: Global University of Islamic Finance  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Abstract 
 
This paper deals with familiar facts in monetary economics from an unfamiliar angle. It argues that it is not 
factual to regard the legal tender money and bank credit as of different genus: they work in tandem to the 
same ends in an economy, conventional or Islamic. Also, it does not matter what serves as money – solid 
gold or flimsy paper – for keeping its value stable; only the blind would argue that staff is indispensable for 
walking.  Money is just an instrument: it was never nor can ever be classified into Islamic and non-Islamic. 
What it does – good or bad – depends on how we use it. Money does not generate crises; its 
mismanagement does. It follows that the refuge the world is searching today from recurring financial crises 
does not lie in money substance: history testifies that national economies could not remain turmoil-free 
during the centuries of the yellow metal sway over the monetary scene. The paper concludes that it is the 
human factor that has been the source of good or evil for mankind including money matters. And the 
quality of human factor true religion can alone improve: morality without faith is rudderless.  
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1. Introduction 
At the dawn of societal living economies were run by a system known as barter: A person 
exchanged whatever good or service he had with the goods or services others possessed. 
Barter required double coincidence of wants – B should not only have what A wanted but 
must also be in need of what A could offer in exchange. This was restrictive of 
transactions that could be made, consumed more time and curtailed specialization. The 
frustrations barter imposed on human ambitions led people to create money. We can 
define money by what it does i.e. by its functions or by identifying the substance which 
performed those functions. The temporal uniformity of the notion lies in the functional 
approach because what substance performed those functions over time and space is a 
welter of things approaching infinity. But herein lays the romance of money. From hides 
and skins via cowrie shells, salt, spices and precious metals to promise to pay working as 
money has been a fascinating journey of human ingenuity. 
 The functional approach to the definition of money sees its significance in serving 
as a medium of exchange, as a measure and a store of value and as a unit of account. In 
essence, these functions help tear apart the two sides of the barter coin – sale and 
purchase. You can sell what you have for money, keep that money with you and buy at 
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will what you want and when. The eventual exchange involves real goods and services at 
both ends; money works merely as a go-between. If paper or plastic can perform the 
functions efficiently why use much more valuable things to serve as money? If roads 
could be built in the air will that not release land for growing more food? Money derives 
its significance from its general acceptability and that acceptability stems from its value 
remaining stable, not from the value of what it is made. We do not print cinema tickets on 
chocolate so that people could eat them in case they miss the movie.  
 Why are then suggestions today for a return to gold as the fulcrum for 
restructuring the international monetary system?
1
 To me, psychology, haplessness, loss of 
direction and presumably some national interests are among the major factors. The search 
for an answer drags us back to the history of the money’s evolution. This we do in the 
following Section 2. In section 3 we shall argue that it is not the systemic failure but the 
demise of human integrity that has pushed the world to the brinks of disaster. In Section 4 
we summarize the argument and present a few policy prescriptions for consideration. 
 
2. Evolution of Money 
2.1 A social convention 
 
Money was not invented: it evolved as a social convention and took various forms over 
time and space. This lent precedence to money substance over its functions in discussions 
on the subject. The importance of what works as money was reinforced as in the process 
of measuring the value (prices) of other goods and services money assumed a value for 
itself that fluctuated inversely with variations in the general price levels over time and 
space. In that money was a different sort of measure compared to others that we use in 
our daily lives. Money made of or linked to something valuable in use, like gold or silver, 
made its value fluctuate inversely with those of other goods and services. The stability in 
the internal value of money thus requires the controlling of fluctuations in the domestic 
price level. Also, what worked as money in various countries is not mostly identical.  
This gave rise to the issues relating to the determination of the values of different moneys 
                                                 
1
 The suggestion that surprised many came from a person of no less stature than the World Bank governor 
Bob Zeollick (December 2010). Interestingly, it gave a boost to the clamor  for a return to Gold Dinars and 
several articles on the subject made their appearance on the  heels of Bob’s statement including Karim 
(2010), KFH Research (2010) and Zein (2011)  
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in terms of each other or foreign exchange rates for promoting inter-nation trade. The 
rising tide of international trade with the passage of time demanded something tangible 
that could help local monies enable their mutual convertibility. The need added to the 
significance of substance for the role money played in an economy. 
Bronze and copper were the first to get converted into coins but gold and silver 
did not take much to replace them. Gold silver coins were made in Lydian – modern 
Turkey - as early as around 560 BC and could well be regarded the earliest forms of 
metallic coins. However, these coins were too soft to withstand the wear and tear in 
circulation or resist corrupt clippings resulting in their weight falling below the initial 
measure. Gold and silver had to be mixed with alloy to make coins adequately hard. This 
demanded standardization of the alloy proportion in the coins to ensure their authenticity 
and uniformity in terms of their precious metal content. The work was done by informal 
private agencies for most part of the 2500 years of sway the yellow metal had over the 
monetary matters across the world. Touchstones were used to verify the purity of coins in 
terms of their fineness. the convention continued even beyond the publication of Smith‘s 
Wealth of Nations,1776. Indeed, the author was much impressed by the spontaneous 
evolution of such benevolent social institutions as money, division of labor and capital 
accumulation that played such a vital role in promoting growth in the wealth of nations.
2
  
Note that gold standard in England was established by an Act of Parliament only in 1860 
and in the USA much later in 1900 
 
2.2 State entry 
 
In the private manufacture of coins, the standardization process required that gold was 
pre-alloyed and coins were weighted before they went into circulation. As long as people 
knew the manufacturer and had trust in him no touchstones were needed. At the time 
when Islam made its appearance on the scene, the gold coins in circulation were made in 
Rome and carried the stamping of pagan idols. The fact that the Prophet (Peace be upon 
him) allowed their remaining in circulation, testifies by implication that the faith did not 
divide money into Islamic and non-Islamic. However, to continue with the thread, the 
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 See Gide & Rist (1953) for an excellent analysis of this influence under a sub-title: The naturalism and 
optimism of Smith pp. 85-109. One would not presumably come across such detaile and graphic description 
of the subject in other books on the History of Economic Thought.   
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governments soon started stamping the coins with an emblem to strengthen the process of 
standardization. The emblem was a guarantee for the weight of the coin, its degree of 
purity and its value. The facility gave people the satisfaction of carrying value within 
their money, but it could not prevent the loss of precious metal in the circulation process 
and more than that through clipping of coins for recycling. Carrying money in pockets 
and over space involved both cost and risk. Governments of all shades soon discovered 
that coins derived their value essentially from the emblem; they often debased the coins 
to lower their precious metal content. To that extent coins became no better than notes 
printed on metal. This led Gresham to postulate during the Victorian era that bad 
(debased) money drives good (full-bodied) money out of circulation.
3
 Finally, the side by 
side circulation of coins made of gold, silver and copper in many places, especially in 
Europe, led merchants to place premium on gold and distort the relative price of metals. 
 
2.2.1. From metals to paper  
To overcome the above mentioned difficulties of commodity money – the coins – banks 
began to issue paper receipts to depositors stating that the receipt was redeemable for the 
precious metals stored with them. Soon the receipts started circulating as money because 
everyone started taking them as good as gold. They were representative of the yellow 
metal. The suggestion for enforcing a 100% reserve requirement today, especially in 
Islamic economics, derives its inspiration from the policy of that era. But much water has 
since turned in the ocean around the world.  
 It soon became apparent to spend money and toil to dig the glittering metal out 
from the bowls of earth only to lock it back into the dark vaults of banks was an 
avoidable folly. To the relief of our pretty ladies, representative money proved just a 
small step to usher in the practice of banking based on fractional reserve. Banks were 
soon printing receipts above and beyond the amount of yellow metal deposited with 
them. It benefited traders and enriched the bankers. Paper notes had appeared in China as 
early as the year 806 AD and dominated the scene until the middle of fifteenth century. 
                                                 
3
 Could that be the reason for the Qur’an to condemn the hoarding of gold and silver (9: 34-35)? Some 
claim gold and silver are Islamic money and their hoarding will reduce the quantity of money in circulation 
to the disadvantage of the economy; so the condemnation of hoarding these metals. I have a different 
interpretation. The reference in the two verses is explicitly to the stock of metals for which Zakat has not 
been paid. Even after zakah has been paid it may not be desirable to retain money just for the sake of 
pleasure of seeing and touching it at will but it may not be punishable the way the verses state.    
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China stopped using paper notes in 1455 because their overproduction led to high 
inflation. But the fractional reserve system being an easy and effortless way for self-
enrichment, the banks could not curb the temptation to over issue notes. Intermittent 
bouts of inflation became rampant across the world. If the linkage of money to gold at its 
zenith could not stop the emergence of the malady; on what basis can the advocates for 
its revival can convince one that the resuscitation of gold can ensure it today? Inflation 
could not, as it cannot, sustain itself for long because it carries within its fold the weapons 
for its own demise. Sooner or later, it must turn its tail upward to nose dives. The slump 
that the burst of the bubble generates is found to be sticky and more damaging. We shall 
return to the issue in some detail later. Presently, we turn to the two interesting 
developments in monetary history that the non-sustainability of inflation triggered.  
 The first was the emergence of the state as a monopolist for the conversion of 
gold into coins and of coins into gold at the official mint. Initially, this service to people 
was rendered free of cost but later on a small fraction of gold (or silver) brought to the 
mint for coinage was used to be taken out to cover manufacturing costs. The deduction 
was known as the seignorage – the right of the king/lord over the possessions of the 
commoners. Thus, free coinage did not mean free of cost. It meant that people were free 
to bring for conversion into coins at the mint only the indicated precious metals – gold or 
silver.
4
 The main reason for acquiring monopoly power in coin-making was its profit 
churning potential. The need to put a tab on money supply for curbing inflation and keep 
it commensurate with the overall needs of the economy was of smaller significance. 
Thus, money creation could not be left entirely to private discretion. And this brings us to 
the second major development.  
 The expanding international trade and the resultant complexity of foreign 
exchange issues added further to the growing governmental interest in the monetary 
affairs. Even as the authorities were attracted to money creation for a variety of reasons, 
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 Coins were divided into two types: Standard and token. Standard coin was full-bodied money. Its face 
value and intrinsic value (the pure gold content at market price) were the same. It was the unit of account , 
unlimited legal tender and a standard for deferred payments. Minting was free only for standard coins. 
Token coins were multiples of standard coin and their face value was more than their intrinsic value. Token 
coins were legal tenders only up to a limit after which one could refuse to accept them in receiving 
payments or discharge of debts. Token coins were made of base metals like copper and did not enjoy the 
facility of free coinage.   
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especially the profit, it was sure to bring in, they did not consider it expedient to put their 
finger in the business directly; they chose to raise a facade – the Central Bank.  
 
2.2.2 The rise of central banking  
The process of government overtaking the creation of money proceeded on a slow pace. 
The first to come in were the regulations limiting the credit creation power of banks. 
They had to cope with some organizational restrictions including the continuation of the 
partners’ liability as unlimited in banking far longer than in other businesses. But at the 
same time, the risks bankers took were sought to be reduced through severe penal 
provisions including in places even capital punishment for the defaulters.   
 The rise of democracy and the concern for human rights brought in some relief for 
the borrowers in the form of increased transparency in dealings and lowering of interest 
rates. Meanwhile, industrial revolution spread fast to other countries in Europe and their 
control of colonies had stabilized. International trade was rapidly expanding. The growth 
of wealth and prosperity of European nations became increasingly dependent on the 
colonies for obtaining industrial inputs and to sell finished products in their vast markets. 
Private banks still had the sway and there is an argument that their coalitions that had 
already started emerging in the face of liquidity shortages could presumably have 
efficiently functioned well also as ‘the lenders of the last resort”. The argument candidly 
implied that the ushering in the central banks was not needed. (Gorton and Hung 2001).. 
But the governmental objectives for intervention as stated above were different. 
Bank failures during the second half of the 19
th
 century created the opportunity for 
intervention and a large number of banks collapsing like a house of card during the inter-
war period only helped hasten the process. Thus, central banks came into existence as a 
response to the inability of banks themselves to cope with panics (Goodhart1985). The 
process took the semblance of a natural evolution as some private banks were asked to 
operate as government’s bank (Gorton & Hung 2001).5  The authors provide some 
interesting information on the rising numbers of the central banks over time. This we 
                                                 
5
 Prior to the establishment of the Reserve Bank of India the Imperial bank was entrusted to work for the 
government. Later it was converted into the State Bank of India and then nationalized. Even today in some 
matters it works as an agent of the RBI where the latter has no branches of its own. The state Bank of 
Pakistan is an off shoot of the same development. 
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reproduce in the following Table. Many of them were allowed to take up the ‘Lender of 
the last resort’ function much later. 
                                   Table 1: Growth of central banks over time 
       
                             Year         1900           1950           1990         
         Number of central banks           20               59              161 
 
 
3. Central banks and economic stability 
The declared objective of establishing a central bank in a country was to have an 
institution devoted to keeping stable the value of its currency both internal and external. 
For performing the function central banks were given some privileges: inter alia they 
were to serve as bankers to the government, granted the sole right for issuing currency 
notes, adopt measures to control the creation of credit by commercial banks and operate 
as the lender of the last resort. Central banks could not compete with ordinary 
commercial banks for business in the market. They had to guide and help the latter with a 
view to achieving stability in the value of money. Since coins of gold were already in 
circulation in many countries, central banks were to streamline the system for the 
issuance of currency with reference to the yellow metal. The rules for such streamlining 
were embodied in what came to be known as gold standard described below 
 
3.1 The Gold standard   
As explained earlier paper money grew gradually out of gold coinage. The era of 100% 
reserve for note issue was very short. As a first step, a certain portion of (legal) money 
was allowed to consist of currency notes convertible into gold which could circulate 
along with coins. A one-on-one reserve of gold for paper currency was not needed to 
ensure convertibility as all people were rarely expected to seek conversion of their notes 
at the same time. Schemes of keeping gold reserves to cushion currency note issue varied 
among countries
6
. But the common element of them all was to have and maintain an 
overall relationship between the gold held in reserves and the volume of currency in the 
country. In other words, gold controlled the volume of money in circulation through 
keeping a minimum gold reserve, however defined. To invoke public confidence, 
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 For a brief discussion of these schemes, see Crowther (1948, pp. 281-300 ) 
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monetary authorities had to keep the price of gold stable in the country. This was the 
essence of what was named in the literature as the domestic gold standard.    
           But gold standard as described above could not ensure price stability at home. For, 
gold standard does not stabilize price levels; it merely stabilizes the relation between the 
volume of gold and the volume of currency. Even if the price of gold remains unchanged, 
fluctuations in the volume of gold must make the volume of currency vary, forcing 
variations in the general level of prices. Thus, Instead of stabilizing, the domestic gold 
standard forced prices to fluctuate
7
; .it failed to curb inflation or to prevent depression. 
       Domestic gold standard was part of the evolution of money - not the result of 
‘invention’ - and its extension to external transactions was part of the same process. 
When gold coins constituted most of the money supply in two countries, there was little 
room for variations in their exchange rate.  So long as the two currencies A and B were 
freely convertible into gold at a fixed price, their rate of exchange could not vary from 
their mint parity by more than the small margin from what were called as the gold points. 
Any demand for foreign currencies that could not be met in the foreign exchange market 
at a rate within say 0.5 percent on either side of the mint par was shunted out to the gold 
market. Thus, the demand for any currency in the foreign exchange market always 
equaled its supply. The gap was covered by the gold movement across the two countries. 
Figure 1 explains the automatic nature of the balancing mechanism.      
                                                  
                                              Figure 1: The Gold. Standard Mechanism 
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 A reduction in the volume of currency may cause a reduction in the quantity of money or it may not the 
two can, on occasions, run divergent courses. See Crowther (1948, p. 297 where he also mentions a few 
historical examples of such diversions with reasons).  
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It is assumed that currency A contains 3.2727273 grains of gold 11/12 fine while 
currency B has 10 grains of gold 9/10 fine. The mint par (the domestic price of foreign 
currency (ER) of the two currencies will then be:                                   
     
 
Assume further that the cost of transporting gold worth 1 units of currency A between the 
two countries is 0.0005 units of that currency. Then, in the foreign exchange market of 
country A the exchange rate .3333 + 0.0005 = .3338 will be the upper gold point (UGP), 
and the lower gold point (LGP) will be (.3333 – 0.0005) = .3328.We now have the 
apparatus to explain how gold standard would operate between the two countries.   
         If the demand for currency B starts rising relative to its supply in country A – the 
balance of payments moves against A – the exchange rate in the market will start rising8 
but it cannot cross the UGP
9
as it will become cheaper for importers to buy gold in the 
market and export it to country B. D1 will cease shifting up: any more; excess of demand 
will move out from the currency market to that of gold, allowing only a tiny (tx) 
departure from ER.. In contrast, if the balance of payments becomes increasingly 
favorable to country A, raising the supply of B currency relative to its demand in the 
exchange market, the ER will start falling: currency A will become dearer in country B. 
But the process cannot go on unabated. As soon as the rate crosses the upper gold point 
which would be the same as LGP in A -- again a small divergence (tm) from ER - the 
importers in country B will find it cheaper to ship gold to country A rather than buy 
currency in the exchange market. Under gold standard no country can stop either export 
of gold or its import. Gold standard works on the assumption that at gold points the 
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 For a real world illustration see Halm (1956, pp.176-177-). He explains how the exchange rate between 
USD and Pound Sterling was settled when both countries were on gold standard during the inter-war period  
 
9
 It may be noted, as shown in Figure 2, that the gold export point of one country becomes the gold import 
point of the other country and vice versa  
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supply of the metal is kept perfectly elastic. The assumption could become a reality only 
if countries or some international authority is willing to buy and sell at a fixed price.  
 Stability of exchange rates is desirable, rather necessary, in the present era of 
globalization for promoting free trade and liberalization, but on a return to gold only the 
naïve or the vested interests will insist. Let me explain very briefly the reasons as to why 
the return is neither desirable nor practicable. The issue of internal stability, I have 
already touched upon. Under the strict rules of the game, it is realistic to assume that the 
central bank of country A keeps gold in reserve just what is obligatory, say 40% of notes 
in circulation, to ensure their convertibility. Suppose now that there is an inflow of gold, 
ignoring reasons, worth $ 1 million. This moves into the reserves of the central bank. If it 
does not, as it cannot, build a buffer stock of gold, it must put additional notes worth $ 
2.5 million in circulation. And if the banking system is to maintain a 10% reserve for 
credit creation the economy would become awash with a monetary expansion of $ 25 
million. This multiple expansion of money supply may impose inflationary pressures on 
an otherwise stable economy. You may work out the deflationary potential of gold out 
flow of a similar magnitude. In fact, gold standard inherently carries a deflationary bias: a 
country losing gold must contract credit but the one receiving it is under no compulsion 
to expand credit.  
 Gold standard can work smoothly if prices - wages in particular - were reasonably 
flexible, there were no structural rigidities in the economy, and public authorities were 
willing to surrender their discretion and independence to the automation requirements of 
gold standard mechanism. The suspension of gold standard under adverse circumstances 
in the past was the proof of the unwillingness of policy makers to accept such surrender.
10
 
This unwillingness has only become more obstinate with the passage of time. This 
obstinacy was one of the reasons why the original designers of the IMF scheme rejected a 
return to gold standard so as to impart a measure of flexibility in the arrangement; the 
amendments of 1978 buried the gold-link for good.  
 Until the beginning of the last century the measure of money requirements was 
the amount of the work money had to do, largely as a medium of exchange. Given the 
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 For a detailed explanation of the monetary expansion and contraction processes under the gold standard 
and their repercussions, see Halm (1956, Chapter 12, section 4 pp. 189-192).  
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velocity V of money circulation, the measure was in close harmony with the level of real 
output. Even as per this criterion, the quantity of money needed could initially be 
managed; but gold supplies soon fell short to meet the monetary needs of economic 
expansion and currency notes with partial metal backing soon appeared on the scene to 
supplement coins. Compare this situation with the current scenario. 
 During the second half of the last century the real output the world produced was 
more than what it could during its entire existence before 1950. Where is the gold to 
support money expansion to match the increase? The growing volume of financial 
transactions knows no bounds. More than a trillion US$ go round the world stock 
markets every twenty four hours in speculative trading. It is estimated that the volume of 
money involved in foreign exchange spot transaction alone is 70 times of the money 
value of world’s real output. Supply of money tied to gold would fail to meet the money 
requirements of the modern age. One may be fond of day dreaming but return to gold is 
not even worth that dream. Today, financial transactions are an ocean wherein real 
transactions are just a tiny island. Return to gold (Dinar) is not possible (Hasan, 2008)..  
 Since the last semblance of national currencies being linked together via gold 
disappeared forty years back all countries have been running their economies entirely 
with fiat money; the money which is not backed by the reserve of any real commodity. 
Legal tender laws are the legs on which it stands. To me it is true money. It is not the 
moon drawing its shine from the sun – the reserves. It is the sun itself.11  
 
3.2 Creation of money  
Undergraduate text books on money and banking invariably make a distinction between legal 
tender money as issued by the central bank of a country and credit or bank money that is 
generated by commercial banks through the granting of loans to borrowers. They also teach us 
that fiscal poli8cy of a country falls in the government terrain while the monetary policy is 
                                                 
11
 It will be wrong to believe that we have fiat money for the first time now. In fact, even during the era of 
commodity money there were legal tender laws put in operation to strengthen the monetary systems. These 
laws legally relieved the debtors of their obligations if they offered to pay the debt using what government 
declared as money. In some cases refusal to accept this form of payment was illegal and could at times 
attract even death penalty. Ancient Rome and post-revolution France are cited as examples. (Cobb 2010. 
Why Cobb (p.12) calls it a major breakthrough in the history of money is not clear. In the past the existence 
of fiat money was an exception, today its non-existence is an exception.    
   
 12 
autonomously designed and operated by its central bank. All such lessons must be taken 
with a grain of salt.   
 The early central banks were established when the mercantilist era was still on. 
They were brought into existence by powerful businessmen controlling politics for 
serving their own nefarious ends (DeLorenzo, 2008). Ownership structures and the role 
of central banks have since witnessed many changes over time and space but their basic 
functions have virtually remained unaltered (Goodhart 2010)
12
. Three of their functions – 
(i) working as bankers to the government, (ii) being the sole issuer of currency notes and 
(iii) controlling of credit the commercial banks create. These functions unfold the linkage 
between the fiscal and monetary policies of a country and the extent of a central bank’s 
autonomy. 
 
3.2.1 Fiscal policy-money supply interface 
The function of the central bank to work as the banker to the government opens the 
window for the latter to interfere with the supply of currency or base money in the 
country. Even as the central banks have the sole right to issue currency notes, the right 
has not always been absolute. For example, in India, the one rupee note which is 
unlimited legal tender was issued by the government of India not by the RBI. The 
government could always exchange these notes for bigger denomination with the latter. 
The second source is that the government can always borrow currency from the RBI 
through the creation of treasury bills which the latter could sell in the money market. The 
conversion of government securities into legal tender money at the RBI was used by the 
British to unleash unprecedented inflationary pressures on the Indian economy to their 
own advantage.
13
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 However, there is a strong case for scrutinizing the power structure in the central banks, especially the 
ones operating in the area of Islamic banking. This can bring to light forces influencing their workings. 
 
13
 In short the story was as follows. When England returned to Gold Standard after the WW1 in the 
twenties the Indian rupee was tied to it at a fixed rate to have the prestige of being on gold (exchange) 
standard via the Sterling. In 1931 England went off the Gold Standard but the Indian rupee remained 
hanging by the Sterling coat minus the prestige. The linkage enabled the British to finance their huge 
balance of payments deficits with the country during the WW2 period through making RBI issue Indian 
currency against the piling up sterling debt, paper just replacing paper. Real goods and services moving to 
.War Theater and money supply expanding within led to high inflation in India. It is interesting to note that 
inflation rate in England at war averaged not more than 7% a year during 1940-1945. Domestic inflation 
was largely transferred to India (and other colonies). 
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 Another example, an eye-opener, comes from the German economy during 
the1920s. After their victory in the WW1 the allied powers imposed such heavy 
reparation on the vanquished that the payments devastated the economy of the country as 
never before in modern history. The annual national income plus the liquidation of the 
accumulated wealth of the Germans was not sufficient to maintain the payments 
schedule. On the one side of the road the central bank was printing notes day and night so 
that the government could purchase goods from the market for export to meet the dates. 
On the other side the Germans ran with basketfuls of currency to beat the spiraling 
inflation – in one year prices rose 10^13 times. Inflation ran parallel to the depreciation 
of the German Mark that in fact had caused it. Table 2 presents the depreciation drama.. 
                                                   Table 2: Exchange rates: 1US$ value in German marks. 
Jan. 1918 5.21 Mar. 1923  21,190.00 
Jan. 1919  8.20  Apr. 1923  24,475.00  
Jan. 1920  64.80  May 1923  47,670.00 
Jan. 1921  64.91  June 1923  109,966.00  
Jan. 1922  191.81 July 1923 353,412.00 
April 1922 291.00 Aug. 1923 4,620,455.00  
July 1922  493.22 Sept. 1923 98,860,000.00 
Oct. 1922  3,180.96  Oct. 1923  25,260,000,000.00  
Jan. 1923 17,972.00 Nov. 1923 2,193,600,000,000.00  
Feb. 1923  27,918.00 Dec. 1923 4,200,000,000,000.00 
Source: Schools History –The seeds of evil: The rise of Hitler 
(ASK.Com// Downloaded on 10.01.2011) 
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Figure 2 is constructed using Table 2 data on semi-logarithmic scale to keep its size 
manageable. We did not put the actual dates on X-axis to avoid congestion. 
In Pakistan also the central bank of the country is at a loss to find ways of 
liquidating the huge debt the government owes to it as the consequence of deficit oriented 
fiscal policies of successive governments. The bank had to print notes unmatched with 
the orresponding expansion in real output. The result was continual depreciation of the 
currency in the foreign exchange markets and inflation at home. 
 It follows from the above discussion that the central bank cannot determine the 
monetary base exogenously. It erodes the capability of the central bank to discipline the 
banking system and tempts the banks to defy cautions in credit creation that brings their 
owners large effortless leverage gains. This requires us to understand the credit creation 
power of banks and its limits. 
 
3.2.2 Money creation by banks 
 
We have already made a distinction between (i) currency or legal tender money and (ii) 
bank the credit or bank money. The two together constitute the M1 version of money 
supply. The relationship between them lies at the heart of credit creation process that 
commercial banks follow. The volume of (i) i.e. currency in an economy serves as the 
base for generating (ii); the credit money. Part of the base money (currency) always 
remains inside the central bank while the remaining part is held outside by the public
14
. 
People deposit a part of the outside money with them in commercial banks as demand or 
time deposits which together constitute the cash deposits of the bank. A portion of 
deposits, say 10%, the banks have to keep with them as statutory reserve to meet the daily 
withdrawal needs of the depositors; the remaining they can lend on interest or invest in 
the Islamic profit earning schemes. In conventional banks the sum loaned is credited to 
the account of the borrower. Thus, loans generate what we call credit deposits. These 
loans and deposits appear one for each other as contra entry in the bank balance sheets. 
The banks make no distinction between the two sorts of deposits – cash or credit – in 
their lending operations.  
                                                 
14
 The classification of currency into outside and inside money is of recent origin and some economists 
have found it a useful explanatory tool in their discussion of the credit creation process of commercial 
banks.  
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To illustrate, let us assume that the amount of currency or base money circulating 
in a country at a time point is IOOT half of which people keep with them under the 
Keynesian liquidity preference motives; the remaining 50T they deposit with the 
commercial banks. Suppose the banks on an average retain F fraction of their cash 
deposits as reserve to meet the daily withdrawals while the central bank wants them to 
maintain with it a minimum fraction R of their deposit – cash plus credit. How much 
credit can a bank create with these constraints? The credit multiplier M provides the 
answer. It is calculated as under.                    
M = 1/F [1 – R] 
Suppose a bank has 50M in cash deposits and has to keep F = 0.1 fraction of the 
sum every moment in its safe to meet the daily withdrawal demands. Furthermore, 
suppose that the central bank requires each commercial bank to maintain with it 5% of its 
deposits – cash plus credit - in the form of cash implying R = 0.05. The credit multiplier 
M will then be 9.5. The 50M cash deposit with the bank will enable it to have total 
deposits worth 50 x 9.5 = 475M.  From that amount if we take out cash deposits, the 
remaining 425M will be the credit (loan) deposits the bank has generated. Note that an 
individual bank cannot create credit disproportionate to others because on balance it will 
soon find its net cash inflows reducing via inter-bank clearances. The cash string forces it 
to remain with the group. However, the created creation power of the banking system is 
on the whole tremendous.  The interest received on this amount minus the part of it 
payable for cash deposit holders and other operating expenses will all belong to the  
 
 
                               Total deposit $475 m. = Cash $ 50 m. + credit $ 425 m.          
 
 
 
 
                                                           Cash deposit  
                                                                           $ 50 m.     
 
Figure 3: Inverted credit pyramid with 
F = 1 / 10 and R = 1 / 20 (Multiplier M = 9.5) 
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 bank. Banking is thus an exceedingly lucrative business. Collectively, banks may 
generate a huge inverted credit pyramid as Figure 3 shows for our illustrative bank. 
Businesses too are tempted to support the process as the rates of interest are 
usually much lower than returns the borrowings provide Producers are tempted to finance 
even long run projects from short-term borrowings because in good times repeated and 
easy renewals can convert them into long-term funding. Leverage gains tend to make 
businesses over adventurous. But continued pumping in of funds ultimately causes the 
credit balloon burst, economies roll down the hill and unemployment tends to become 
rampant. Should Islamic banks indulge in credit creation as do the commercial banks as a 
part of the process? I refrain from discussing this issue here because I have already 
discussed it threadbare in my earlier writings (Hasan 2008 and 2010) However, put 
briefly my position is as follows. 
 
3.2.3 Islamic banks: credit creation and the crisis  
 
Commercial banks and their functions evolved over time in response to the changing and 
expanding needs of trade industry and commerce. Eventually, they emerged for meeting 
the short-term needs of business. These needs have been of seasonal character and 
creation of base money was geared to the more enduring demand for money to serve as a 
medium of exchange and a store of value. Credit creation is meant to keep the growth of 
base money smooth over time. This development left untouched the financing modes in 
Muslim lands.  Islamic finance emerged on the seen very late for a variety of reasons. 
Innocuously, it chose to follow in the footsteps of the same system that it rose to replace. 
To me, Islamic banks have little option in the mutter of credit creation: their methods and 
precautions could of course be different. The real problem in fact is on the control side: 
what would or could replace the bank rate as control weapon in the hands of the central 
bank. Even in the case of conventional banks, the policy has failed to deliver. Long run 
profit expectations tend to run much higher above the schedules of interest rates after the 
WW2. The rising leverage ratios and commissions have to be curbed. Perhaps, there 
exists a case for taxation of leverage gains with steep progression. 
It seems a bit misguiding to claim that Islamic banks withstood the current crisis 
better than their mainstream counterparts. They are yet too small to catch the cold and 
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have not nursed the linkages for infection. And yet many Islamic banks did come to grief. 
Kuwait has recently refused to bailout the defaulting banks in the country.  
  
4 4. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper had set out to discuss some familiar ideas in the area of money creation and 
control in modern societies from an Islamic angle but arrived at some unfamiliar 
conclusion. The main ones are as under. 
1. Money evolved as a social convention. Its essence lies in what it does, not in what 
it is made of. Its significance follows from the fact that it tears apart the two sides 
of the barter coin into sale and purchase. Money has no religious content. It was 
never nor can ever be divided into Islamic and non-Islamic  
2. Gold standard was evolved by the erstwhile imperial powers to exploit colonies 
for obtaining raw material and other inputs for their growing industries and open 
their vast markets for selling their products. It sacrificed the internal stability at 
the alter of external stability  That often hurt the developing nations, Gold 
standard never ensured never ensured that none will lurch; it only ensured that all 
will lurch together. The world should never return to gold. Presently, the IMF 
rules bar the linking of any currency to gold. The dinarists are traveling on a 
blocked end road. 
3. The autonomy of central banks is illusory. Governments have always been the 
prime movers in the matter of money supply. Fiscal policies have frequently been 
the undoing of monetary policies initiated by central banks. Governors of central 
banks are after all appointed by the government; they have to watch the 
movement of the authoritative eyes. They tend to be late to miss the train and 
under kill to avoid the charge of over killing. 
I believe that any system can possibly deliver if human element is virtuous. Human 
beings are the greatest source of instability in the world – political, economic and 
social. Presidents retire and only then the nation knows that they bankrupted the 
nation for self-enrichments. Corruption, conspiracy and injustice rule the world. 
Powerful armies have marched for non-existent reasons into flourishing countries and 
destroyed them completely And for that they got away by merely saying sorry. The 
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entire nations as Greece have gone bankrupt because of the misdeeds of their rulers – 
democratic or despotic. Today, if banks are too big to fail, nations are much bigger. 
To me all reforms will fail to deliver unless human beings are reformed. Rational 
morality has failed; faith is the hope.    
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